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ABSTRACT 
The following articles submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the 
degree of PhD by published works attempt to restate, refme and extend various 
themes in the tradition of the Austrian School of Economics and their 
relationship to selected topics in political economy. 
It is argued that two traditions developed out of the "marginal revolution" in 
economic theory, beginning in the 1870s: the Neo-Classical and Austrian 
approachs. In the Neo-Classical tradition, a theory of economic eqUilibrium is 
formulated on the basis of a "static" view of man and the market, in which 
actors are assumed to have a "given" ends-means framework in which agents 
narrowly maximize to attain "optimal" results within their respective decisions 
and across individuals for determination of interpersonal eqUilibrium. The 
Austrians, on the other hand, developed a more dynamic process theory of 
market activities based on a conception of man as an intentional being who 
creates his ends-means framework and initiates actions to improve his 
circumstances. The Austrian framework emphasized the role of time, 
uncertainty and imperfect knowledge, with a focus on the temporal-sequence of 
market interactions that may tend to bring about a pattern of interpersonal 
coordination of individual plans. It is also explained how the Classical 
Economists' concept of man and the market was much closer to the Austrian 
perspective than to that of the Neo-Classical Economists. 
The Austrian approach is extended by showing a "phenomenological 
foundation" to Austrian Economics in the writings of Edmund Husser! and its 
influence on the methodological works of Ludwig von Mises. The sociological 
contribUtions of Max Weber are shown to be the starting point for Mises' theory 
of "action," and how Weber's conception of the Ideal Type was adopted by Mises 
as a tool for understanding the process of expectations-formation in the market. 
The writings of Austian sociologiSt, Alfred Schutz, are used to explain the 
reasoning behind the Austrian theory of action and the mental processes 
through which the social actors creatively imagine what becomes the ends-
means framework, which the Neo-Classical Economists assume are "given." 
Schutz's refinement of Weber's Ideal Typification schema is reformulated to 
explain the process through which individuals in the social and market arenas 
construct situational and personal ideal types that create the structures of 
intersubjective meaning enabling expectations-formation and the potential for 
interpersonal plan coordination. 
Lastly, the Austrian theme of acting man and the market process are applied to 
the issues of economic calculation under socialism, problems with Neo-
Classical assumptions concerning government intervention in the market 
economy and the limits of economic policy within the market order. 
Austrian Economics 
and the 
Political Economy of Freedom 
by 
Richard M. Ebeling 
CONTEXT STATEMENT 
The Unifying Theme: The Market Process, Expectations-Formation and the 
Free Economy in the Neo-Classical and Austrian Economic Traditions 
Two traditions have developed in economics out of the Marginalist 
Revolution of the late nineteenth century. One variation emerged out of the 
early contributions of William Stanley Jevons and Leon Walras. The emphasis 
in this tradition has been on a rigorous formalization of general eqUilibrium 
through the applications of mathematical and quantitative methods. A central 
construct in this approach has been a formal model of "perfect competition" on 
the assumption of perfect and objectivized knowledge. In this model the human 
actor is reduced to the status of a reactor to given constraints: his tastes and 
preferences and the trade-offs at which alternatives are available to him. The 
"ends" of the individual are assumed to be "given" and ranked in order of 
relative importance. The "means" at his disposal are assumed to be known in 
terms of their quantities and qualities. A set of "prices" or terms-of trade are 
assumed to be given to each individual actor, who then determines on the baSis 
of his given means and ends the relative amounts of goods he is willing to 
supply and demand at those alternative prices. Equilibrium is then determined 
at those prices at which the respective demands and supplies of the market 
participants are in balance across all markets simultaneously. 
In perfect competition, the actors are assumed to possess "perfect" or 
sufficient knowledge of all market circumstances in which they find themselves. 
They can never err. They are presumed to know their objective technological 
possibilities in terms of transfonntng resources into finished consumer goods. 
They are, likewise, presumed to know the objective prices at which resources, 
capital and labor may be purchased or hired on the market. With these two 
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sources of "data" the actor can detennine the monetary outlays that will be 
required to be paid out to produce any desired level of output. At the same time, 
they are presumed to know the price at which they may sell any chosen 
quantity of output to buyers on the market. The actor's "task" in this framework 
is to select that level of production at which he maximizes his net revenue, 
given his known costs of production and known selling price to the consuming 
pUblic. 
Since every agent possesses equivalent knowledge of his market 
circumstances, neither profit nor loss can exist in any market. Such perfect or 
sufficient knowledge necessarily includes infonnation about all future changes 
in market conditions. This must imply that any change in future supply or 
demand that would otheIWise generate a positive or negative discrepancy 
between price and costs must be fully anticipated by those same market actors. 
This assures that all necessary adjustments in the use of resources, the 
production of different goods and services, and movements in cost-prices and 
sale-pJ1ces that are required to reflect any changes as they materialized on the 
market are synchronized to occur at just the right moments. Indeed, taken 
strictly, in the perfect competition model there is no room for unexpected 
change, because by definition this would be inconsistent with the perfect 
knowledge assumption. As a result, no matter the frequency or magnitude of 
any objective changes, all markets can never be in anything other than 
continual perfect general equilibrium. 
During the last four decades two modifications have been introduced to 
this model. The first was the economics of infonnation and search. It was 
posited that actors do not necessarily begin with full information about market 
opportunities. Instead, they undertake processes of search to acquire 
knowledge about the objective distribution of, say, prices at which desired 
goods may be bought on the market. Each actor continues his search for as 
long as he believes that the marginal benefit of one more unit of price 
information exceeds the marginal cost of the time incurred in pursuing the 
search and the forgone purchase opportunities by not consummating one of the 
exchange options already discovered. The optimal amount of information each 
actor chooses to obtain, therefore, may leave him with a level of information 
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that will be less than "perfect." But the amount of information that he chooses 
to buy through the costs of search is an equilibrium amount. since it represents 
that amount of information at which his marginal cost equals his marginal 
benefit. Thus, the chosen amount of less-than-full information is one that 
represents "rational ignorance." Any additional information Just would not be 
worth the extra expense to acqUire. 
The second modification has been in the form of the Rational 
Expectations hypothesis. It is postulated that in the pursuit of utility 
maximization, no actor would rationally make a mistake that he could have 
avoided and which if made reduces his level of satisfaction. Actors have an 
incentive to discover causal relationships between variables in the market to 
more correctly anticipate the likely trends of market outcomes. Thus, they 
attempt to determine the theoretical model that most correctly captures the 
actual working of the economy in which they make their decisions and chOices. 
At the same time, these outcomes can only be specified in terms of their 
frequency in probabilistic terms. As a consequence, the actor can at most only 
hope to establish a subjective probability distribution of outcomes that is the 
same as the objective probability of their likely occurrence. The "error term" in 
the Rational Expectations equations can at best have a mean value of zero. 
The other Marginalist tradition emerged out of the writings of the 
Austrian EconOmists, Carl Menger and Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk. The Austrian 
tradition placed a greater, in fact, a central emphasis on the causal processes of 
the market. The essential concepts have been human intentionality and 
"subjective meaning," as understood in Max Weber's use of the idea of 
"purposeful action." EspeCially following the writings of Ludwig von Mises, the 
Austrian Economists have argued that a theory- of human action should be 
constructed on the basis of the qualities and characteristics that common-
sense reflection suggest are the natural conditions under which the human 
actor chooses and acts. Thus, the Austrians have emphasized imperfect 
knowledge, decision-making under uncertainty, and the possibility of error. 
Furthermore, they have argued that "choice" should not be viewed as fully 
predetermined or predictable from some prior "data" of the "given" situation. 
Instead, choice emerges out of mental processes in which the actor, in a 
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fundamental sense, creates the "ends" and "means" and the tenns-of-trade in 
the context of which a choice will be made. Hence, the "givens" of Neo-Classical 
theozy in which choices are made are, in fact, not given to either actor or 
analyst prior to the actual choice-making process itself. 
The Austrian Economists also have assigned crucial importance to 
understanding the role of the entrepreneur as initiator and coordinator of 
enterprising activities, and the processes through which multitudes of human 
plans in the market mayor may not be successfully coordinated through the 
institUtions of market competition and the price system. Their emphasis has 
been less on the final state of any general equilibrium and more on the 
processes of creation, adjustment and change in temporal sequences of market 
interaction. A hypothetical equilibrium state has served more as a conceptual 
reference point to explain the circumstances under which there would no longer 
be incentives or opportunities for further profitable actions by either demanders 
or suppliers. The task of market theory, in the view of most Austrians, has been 
to logically explain and trace out the implications and consequences of the 
process by which market actors discover potential gains-from-trade at 
particular moments in time and through time. 
But as Austrian economist, Ludwig M. Lachmann, once observed. 
"Unfortunately, they [the Austrians) never were able to show, with the cogency 
their case required, the incompatibility between the idea of planned action, the 
vezy core of Austrian economic thought, and an analytical model which knows 
no action, but only reaction" (Lachmann, 1969, 164). The Neo-Classical 
perspective has been that the Austrian emphasis on methodological 
subjectivism has been incorporated in mainstream economics in the fonn of the 
"data" of the subjective tastes and preferences of the individual market 
partiCipants. And the additional problem that decision-making only occurs 
under conditions of some degree of uncertainty has been incorporated into 
mainstream economics through the application of statistical probability theory 
for explaining the process of expectations-formation. For the Austrians this has 
seemed in some essential way to have failed to grasp what they actually have 
meant by "subjectivism" and "uncertainty," as well as certain unique qualities 
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of the process by which actors form expectations about the future in the arena 
of market interaction. 
This has spilled over into the area of economic policy-making, also. Far 
differently than both the Classical Economists of the nineteenth century or the 
Austrians in the twentieth, Neo-Classical Economists have often assumed that 
government has a fairly extensive ability to manage, regulate and plan the 
economic affairs of the society. This has almost logically followed from the type 
of knowledge Neo-Classical theorists have assumed actors and analysts to 
possess. If the benchmark of an "efficient" or "optimally" functioning market is 
one in which the agents are assumed to possess all "relevant" infonnation to 
make error-free chOices (as in the case of the perfect competition model), then 
any actual pricing, production and transaction mistakes must in some way 
demonstrate instances of "market failure." 
The extreme form of this is what Friedrich Hayek has referred to as the 
"pretense of knowledge" (Hayek, 1975, 23-34), the confidence that it was 
possible for a central planning authority to comprehensively direct and 
coordinate the economic activities of an entire community possessing a highly 
developed system of diviSion of labor. Through the early and middle decades of 
the twentieth century there was a general consensus among Neo-Classical 
economists that. even if socialist central planning could be challenged 
politically as a possible threat to some amount of personal freedom, from the 
economic point-of-view it was possible "in principle" for an economy to be 
centrally planned with results at least no worse than the ones produced by a 
private, competitive market (Knight. 1936. 255-266; Pigou, 1937; Schumpeter. 
1942). And as late as the 1960s, there were even suggestions that the Soviet-
style, centrally planned economy might exceed the productive possibilities of 
the American-type of market economy before the end of the century 
(Samuelson, 1967,790-792). 
At the level of economic policy, therefore, the Neo-Classical approach has 
tended to Judge the effiCiency of the market and alternative economic 
institutional orders by the extent to which they have appeared to more or less 
reflect the state of general equilibrium as captured in the perfect competition 
model. The Austrians, on the other hand, have argued that given the actors' 
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imperfect knowledge, the problem of the market coordination of large numbers 
of people is more likely to be successfully brought about by unregulated market 
forces operating within the general institutional gUidelines of private property, 
voluntary exchange and contract enforcement, regardless of the possible 
achievement of some hypothetical perfect eqUilibrium. 
In the following articles, my purpose is to more clearly delineate the 
unique features of the Classical Economists and most especially the Austrian 
Economists that serve to differentiate their approach from the Neo-Classical 
framework that has dOminated the mainstream of economic theory and policy 
for most of this century. I argue that the ClaSSical Economists of the nineteenth 
century generally viewed the economic process as one accentuated by active, 
goal-oriented individuals whose interactions in the particular institutional order 
of private property, voluntary exchange and division of labor would generate a 
free and prosperous order without political design. The Neo-Classical approach, 
that began to develop in the late nineteenth century, constructed a conception 
of man that drained him of the veIY features that made him the creator of a 
spontaneous order, as conceived by the ClaSSical Economists. Man was reduced 
to a dependent variable in a series of mathematical equations designed to 
permit the detenuination of hypothetical general eqUilibrium states. This 
dehumanization of the conception of man, I argue, also influenced the mind-set 
with which economists came to think about economic policy and the 
refashiOning of the social and economic order through planning and regulatory 
manipulation. 
The Austrian School of Economics accepted a view of man that, in its 
general outlook, was more like the Classicals who preceded them. Man, in the 
Austrian perspective, is an "actor" not a mere passive responder to his "given" 
circumstances, and I trace out their framework of man as doer of acts and 
entrepreneurial creator of market opportunities. The Austrians conceived of the 
market as an on-going process rather than in tenus of any possible end-point 
eqUilibrium state. Consistent with this theme they incorporated time into their 
theories of production, capital-fonuation, and intertemporal exchange. The 
entire network of market transactions is integrated through prices, rivalrous 
competition, and the profit and loss system. The AustIians also incorporated a 
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theory of the unintended consequences of human action and the limits to 
various government policies of control and intervention within the economic 
order. 
But several problems have never been successfully answered in the 
Austrian literature. First, what is the distinct method for theory fonnation in 
Austrian Economics, especially as developed in the writings of Ludwig von 
Mises? Second. in what way is the Austrian conception of "action" and choice-
making different from the Neo-Classical view? And, third, in a world of 
uncertainty and the mutual interdependency of market relationships. what 
might be an "Austrian" theory of expectations that is different and distinct from 
the Rational Expectations approach of Neo-Classical EconOmics? 
Concerning the first question, I explain that Mises' method of theory 
fonnation is the tool of imaginary constructions through mental experiments. 
But I clarify for the first time that ... the philosophical background to Mises' 
method is to be found in Edmund Hussert's phenomenological technique of 
"eidetic reduction" to uncover the "essence" of things. It is this "essentialist" 
approach that is the basiS of the Misesian method of tracing out the meaning of 
the "essence of action" and his logical implications. 
In a series of articles, I attempt to apply the ideas of the Austrian 
sociologist. Alfred Schutz. and integrate them with Austrian EconomiCs to 
answer the second and third questions. Schutz had been a student at the 
University of Vienna and was in close association With many of the leading 
Austrian Economists in the 1920s and 1930s, so the connection between the 
two is not so far apart. While a number of Austrians have taken notice of 
Schutz's writings and sometimes suggested their relevance to economics 
(Rothbard. 1973. 28-57; Machlup. 1978,211-281), there was no real attempt to 
utilize them in the way I have tried to before the articles I began to wrtte on this 
theme. 
I show that Schutz's theory of choosing among projects of action 
demonstrates not only the unique properties of the open-endedness of the 
choice-creating process, but also why the Neo-Classical view of the logic of 
choice cannot be as deterministic and predictive as the framework suggests. I 
also explain that Mises' conception of "action" as intentional conduct is derived 
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from the earlier work of the Gennan sociologist, Max Weber. Mises also adopted 
Weber's tool of the "ideal type" not only as a useful instrument for historical 
analysis, but for understanding how actors in the society in general and the 
market in particular form..flll expectations for purposes of mutual orientation in 
the area of "social action." Schutz incorporated Husserl's phenomenological 
method and Weber's theory of action to fonnulate a theory of social action. 
Central to Schutz's work was the idea of "structures of intersubjective 
meaning." I clarify and apply Schutz's idea to show how these structures serve 
as the method through which actors in the social and market arenas form 
patterns of intersubjective expectations for mutual coordination of plans. I 
demonstrate how this method permits actors to antiCipate the possible future 
actions of others without having to rely on the special requirements of 
statistical quantification and reduction of the "data" to probabilistic frequency 
distributions. 
At the level of alternative economic systems and economic policy I 
discuss the practicability of SOCialism, the problems with economic intervention, 
and the contrast between the Austrian and German OROO Liberal views of the 
limits of government regulation and control. In an exercise into the history of 
economic thought I show that there were five Significant contributions before 
the First World War that made many of the same Criticisms of socialist central 
planning developed by Mises and Hayek in the period between the two world 
wars. These five economists argued that socialism could not provide a 
successful substitute for market-generated prices for economic calculation, 
coordination of decentralized infonnation, the competitive process for the 
selection of entrepreneurs and the direction of production for the rational 
allocation of resources including labor. In an analysis of various rationales for 
political intervention within the market economy I discuss the weakness of the 
perfect competition model, the logical and practical problems with appeals to 
"social justice," and the ambiguities and errors in references to the "public 
interest." And, finally, I contrast two groups of economists. the Austrians and 
the German ORDO Liberals. on the limits of economic policy. I discuss their 
common arguments against socialism and many fonns of political 
interventionism, yet at the same time their different interpretations about the 
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development of nineteenth centUlY capitalism and their resulting diverging 
conclusions concerning the proper limits of government interference in the 
market economy. 
An Overview of Classical, Neo-Classical and Austrian Perspectives 
In How Economics Became the Dismal Science (Ebeling. 1994. 51-81) 
I explain some of the fundamental premises of the Classical Economists and 
how their view of the economic problem and its policy implications radically 
differed from modem. mainstream. Neo-Classical Economics. Central to the 
Classical way of thinking was the discovery that economic order was possible 
without political design. The human actor was seen as a discoverer of gains-
from-trade. the initiator of market transactions for mutual benefit, with market 
competition and the system of prices being the institutional framework through 
which the activities of all the members of the global community were brought 
into balance and patterned structure. They were confident in having unearthed 
the socio-economic regime that could provide both freedom and prosperity. 
Though they may have sometimes constructed one-sided conceptions of an 
"economic man," theirs was a common sense, everyday treatment of man and 
the human condition, and of the processes by which markets perfonned the 
role of coordinating economic activities. At the same time, they conSidered it 
presumptuous to believe that in most Situations government regulation or 
control could do better than the market left to itself. Both Adam Smith and 
Jeremy Bentham took careful note of the fact that each man knows his own 
interests, his own local circumstances and has the strongest incentive to 
judiciously apply his knowledge for successful effect far better than any 
legislator, minister or regulator who presumed to manage his affairs and direct 
his activities. 
The Classical view. I suggest. is in stark contrast to the way Neo-
Classical Economics has viewed man. the economic problem and the role of 
government in society. Under the influence of a belief that the social sciences 
had to emulate the methods of the natural sciences. Neo-Classical Economics -
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starting in the last decades of the nineteenth century especially under the 
influence of Jevons, Walras, Francis Edgeworth and Vilfredo Pareto - adopted 
the mathematical method as the primary technique for the fonnulation of 
economic theory. Since economics deals with quantities of supply and demand, 
ratios of exchange, rates of change, and quantitative minima and maxima, this 
made the discipline mathematical by definition. 
But this also meant a significantly different conception of man and his 
place in the nexus of economic events. He is now reduced to being one of the 
"data" in the fonn of his given tastes and preferences, the quantitative aspect of 
which now makes its contribution to the determination of general equilibrium 
outcomes. As Pareto expressed it: "The individual can disappear, provided he 
leaves us this photograph of his tastes" (Pareto, 1927, 120). Man becomes 
merely one of the dependent variables in a system of interdependent equations 
for an economic eqUilibrium. Or, as the Swedish economist, Gustav Cassel, 
once visualized it, man is now "merely fate detennined, like wind-blown 
shavings raised and lowered on the curves of mathematical determination" 
(Englund, 1943, 474). There is no place in this conception of man for acting 
men who know best their own Interests, or who can evaluate best their own 
local circumstances, or who can Judge how to pursue their own interests and 
use their local circumstances to the best effect in the face of profit opportunities 
as they may see them. Man becomes inanimate matter manifested in the form 
of relative amounts of various combinations of goods "chosen" when confronted 
with a "given" set of prices. 
As an extension of this newer view of man, Neo-Classical Economics 
became more receptive to admitting the possibilities for government 
intervention, regulation and control than the Classical Economists, in general, 
had been. With man now viewed merely as a passive responder to his given 
circumstances, and with a misplaced confidence on the part of a growing 
number of economists that they had the ability not only to master qualitatively 
but quantitatively the Interconnected relationships between all of the factors at 
work in the economic system, it became an easy step to conclude that men and 
their "choices" were capable of manipulation in the name of attaining more 
"optimal" outcomes than when men were left on their own in the market. This 
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was an attitude, I explain, that was increasingly held by economists on both the 
"left" and "right." The professional economist possessed the theoretical and 
quantitative tools to remake, or at least modify, the economic terrain, due to the 
higher plain from which the Neo-Classical Economist claimed to be able to see 
the workings of the world. Neo-Classical Economists, I conclude, have lost the 
modesty and more common-sensical reasonableness of their Classical 
predecessors. 
In The Significance of Austrian Economics in Twentieth-Century 
Economic Thought (Ebeling, 1991, 1-40) I summarize the alternative 
conception of economic theory and method as developed by the Austrian 
Economists from Menger and Bohm-Bawerk to Mises and Hayek. Essential to 
understanding the distinction between the Austrian and Neo-Classical 
tk 
EconOmists, I explain, is the difference between "'Austrian's Logic of Action and 
the Neo-Classical's Logic of Choice. For the Neo-Classical theorist, man is the 
"chooser" within a set of superimposed "given" constraints. He is assumed to 
already have a set of given ends which have been ranked in order of 
importance, an endowment of given means technologically known to be usable 
for certain uses and applications, and to be confronted with various terms-of-
trade in the form of market prices at which he may trade-off the alternatives 
amongst which he must choose. Given his tastes, means and price constraints, 
the individual merely calculates what has to be the only rational and optimal 
"choice" in his objectively known circumstances. All the individual's decisions 
are in principle predictable, in fact, preordained, in this Logic of ChOice, since 
any choice other than the one dictated by the "given" conditions would be by 
definition sub-optimal and therefore contrary to the purpose of utility 
maximization. 
For the Austrians, however, this is beginning the analysis one step 
removed from its causal origin in the mental processes of the individual actors. 
The Austrians, in other words, ask, from whence come the "givens" the Neo-
Classical approach takes as its starting point? They argue that the individual 
creatively imagines a future state (or states) of affairs, conceives of ways in 
It (et' 
which the objects of the world might be usable as means to attain titer? tries to 
discern causal relationships in the use of those means, and weighs the worth to 
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tb8IMs8wes of giving up one goal possibly to achieve some other. Thus, "ends," 
"means" and "trade-offs" arise from and are brought into existence out of the 
minds of men; they do not exist independently and separately from the human 
minds that generate them. This is the basiS for the Austrian conception of a 
wider notion of subjectivism than merely an agent's given tastes and 
preferences. These intentional activities of the mind are a reason why the 
Austrians often refer to their approach as a Logic of Action. 
Integral parts of this Austrian approach are the ideas of uncertainty, 
4? m f'/(1'j 
imperfect knowledge and the passing of time. To ~ means to attain an end 
implies a before and an after; to weigh alternatives and select among them 
implies that the future is open to being influenced by the course of action 
chosen by the actor and is not wholly predetermined; and the existence of an 
uncertain future means that the actor decides in a context of less than perfect 
information about the future and the consequences from his own actions and 
those of others; actions, therefore, undertaken with less than perfect knowledge 
cany within them the possibility of unintended results different from what was 
planned. 
Future oriented actions by necessity are "speculative." Thus, from the 
Austrian perspective all actions contain an "entrepreneurial" element. This has 
led the Austrians to give particular attention to those in the market system of 
division of labor who specialize in performing the entrepreneurial task of 
conceiving future patterns of consumer demand, designing the production 
possibilities, hiring the factors of production and directing their use for the 
manufacture, supplying and sale of final goods and services. At the same tlme, 
the question then arises as to the institutional arrangement in the context of 
which entrepreneurship will be facilitated, exercised and directed more 
successfully towards that end-result of supplying the consuming public with 
goods they do or may desire to acquire. 
Thought of as a dynamic on-going process, competition is the method 
through which each member in the social system of division of labor finds the 
line of endeavor that represents his comparative advantage; one of those 
specializations is the function of entrepreneur as gUider and coordinator of 
productlon. Profit and loss serve as the indicators of who is best qualified for 
12 
this role. At the same time, information about the changing patterns of supply 
and demand is dispersed to all the members of the social system of 
consumption and production through the structure of market prices generated 
out of the rivalrous bids and offers of multitudes of participants in the exchange 
process. 
The complexity of the structure of relative prices and integration of factor 
and final goods markets is made possible only due to the use and effectiveness 
of a medium of exchange. Money, therefore, connects the individual parts of the 
market into an economy-Wide tapestry of the whole. But the particular Austrian 
"twist" to money's macroeconomic role is an inSistence on viewing the value of 
money not in tenns of a statistically-derived average level of prices, but as the 
array or set of exchange ratios between money and each of the individual goods 
against which it trades. Through this method the Austrians construct their 
microeconomic foundations to economy-Wide macroeconomic phenomena. 
Every change in the demand for or supply of a particular good not only changes 
the structure of relative prices, but also modifies the value or purchasing power 
of money as expressed in the array of exchange ratios between money and other 
goods as well. At the same time, any change in the supply of or demand for 
money can only be transmitted through the economy by a change in 
individuals' willingness to offer more or less money for particular goods traded 
for money on the market. This changes the value or purchasing power of the 
monetary unit, but also in the process influences the structure of relative 
prices. Thus, the micro and the macro in economics are inseparably 
intertwined. 
For the Austrians, the concept of causality carries with it an awareness 
of time and duration. Time pervades the Austrian schema in two ways: as 
something that requires valuation and something that influences the structure 
of plans and production. Time often makes mutually exclusive two desired 
courses of action: individuals then have to choose between what they prefer 
"sooner" and "later." Time also pervades the processes by which means are 
applied to attain deSired ends; each plan, therefore, contains a "period of 
production." Out of differing time valuations between individuals arise potential 
gains-from-trade that generates an intertemporal price - the rate of interest. 
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And the amount of means set aside from more immediate consumption us~ as 
"savings" detennines the investment time-horizons that may be undertaken 
with some confidence of successful completion. How the intertemporal price 
structure and the distribution of scarce resources among plans of production of 
varying duration may become out of balance with the underlying time-
valuations of individuals and the actual amount of savings available to sustain 
attempted periods of production has been explained in the Austrian theory of 
the business cycle. 
The Austrian emphasis on active intentionality on the part of individual 
decision-makers has led a number of the members of the School to give especial 
emphasis to the evolution and development of institutions and societal patterns 
that are the unintended consequences of human action. From the interactions 
of multitudes of individuals, each pursuing their own particular ends, Austrians 
such as Menger and Hayek have clarified how a complex social order emerges, 
forms and sustains itself, without either prior design or directed central plan. 
Through evolved rules and codes of Interpersonal conduct, and customs and 
patterns of social and market interaction, individuals may retain a wide latitude 
of personal freedom in their actions, while, at the same time, constantly having 
incentives for constructing and adjusting their respective plans in ways that 
tend to be harmonious with and mutually beneficial for many of the other 
members of society. 
Finally, the Austrians have drawn various economic policy conclusions 
from their theoretical explorations into social and market phenomena. Their 
fundamental argument is that a complex economic order cannot successfully 
function for purposes of mutual coordination of multitudes of human plans 
without the institutions of private property and market competition. Only in a 
setting in which individuals may own goods and resources and buy and sell 
them will they have the incentives and opportunities to evaluate and appraise 
their usefulness for the attainment of competing purposes for which they could 
be applied. Out of these valuations and appratsements emerge gains-from-trade 
that manifest themselves in the fonn of market prices in consummated 
transactions. And these market prices, expressed in the common denominator 
of money offered to buy and sell goods and resources, then serve as the device 
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for economic calculation which make possible the efficient use of the scarce 
means of production and the economizing of dispersed information for the 
coordinating of those multitudes of individual consumer and producer plans. 
The Austrians concluded that both socialism and political inteIVention 
with the free competitive process prevent or impede effective use of people's 
abilities and knowledge for the greater mutual benefit of all the members of 
society. Traditional socialism abolishes private property, eliminates private 
buying and selling of goods and resources, and imposes centrally directed 
planning on all economic activity. By doing so, socialist central planning does 
away with all the mechanisms for discovering what the members of the SOCiety 
consider worth buying, how best to produce the goods desired by the 
consuming public, and how to balance the plans of production with those of 
consumption for a rational apportioning of men and material among their 
alternative uses. Political intervention in the market through regulations, 
controls and prohibitions does not do away with the competitive process in the 
same radical manner as comprehensive socialist planning. But it prevents the 
free chOices and decisions of individuals from determining what actually gets 
produced, in what productive manner, at what prices and costs and for whose 
mutual benefit. If, as the Austrians have argued, more knowledge and 
information is dispersed among the various members of society than can ever 
be fully mastered, appreCiated and integrated in a single mind or among the 
best of a handful of minds, then both socialism and political intervention in the 
market must reduce the effectiveness and efficiency of how the economic order 
works and its results. 
A Foundation for Subjectivism and the Role of "Ideal Types" in the 
Coordination of the Market Process 
In Austrian Subjectivism and Phenomenological Foundations 
(Ebeling, 1995, 39-53) I explain the meaning of the phenomenological method, 
as found in the writings of Edmund Husserl, as a foundation for the Austrian 
subjectivist approach. Its usefulness for this purpose was clearly stated by 
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Ludwig von Mises, in a passage from one of his methodological essays that 
seems not to have been focused upon previously: "The importance of 
phenomenology for the solution of the epistemological problems of praxeology 
has not been noticed at all" (Mises, 1944, 19). 
The uniqueness of Austrian subJectivism, in contrast to the Neo-Classical 
subjectivism of given tastes and preferences, is its intentionallst starting-point. 
Man is not merely one of the many quantitative Variables the simultaneous 
interactions of which produce a general eqUilibrium solution. Man, instead, is 
the focal, the Achimedian, point around which the social world revolves and 
comes into being. Man is, in the words of the American "Austrian," Frank A. 
Fetter, not merely the passive evaluator of goods, but the "doer of acts." From 
Menger through Mises, the Austrians have seen man as the being that gives 
meaning, order, structure and significance to the world. Ends and means, costs 
and benefits, "sooner" or "later," finished consumer good and factor of 
prodUction, profit and loss, friend or foe - are all ultimately concepts and 
relationships that are creations of the human mind. The alpha and omega of 
social phenomena is the subjective world of acting man. The laws of nature and 
the physical environment may be the limits within which human endeavors are 
possible of accomplishment, but it is the human actor's conceptions and 
perceptions of the desirable, possible and attainable that serve as the diving rod 
for actions initiated, productions undertaken and social relationships fonned. 
Such thinkers as Wilhelm Dilthey, Heinrich Ricket, Max Weber, Franz 
Brentano and Edmund Hussed influenced the philosophical environment in 
which the Austrians reflected on the foundations of the social sciences. Dilthey, 
Ricket and Weber, each in his own way, attempted to resist the reduction of 
human events to a purely quantitative law-like dimension along the lines of the 
positivist conception of the natural sciences. They drew attention to the 
historically unique as the by-product of conscious human action, to which the 
actors assigned subjective meaning and importance. 
Brentano and Husserl focused on the deeper philosophical meanings and 
implications of intentionality. Man is born into a world of preexisting meanings, 
which he learns and absorbs through a process of acculturation from early 
childhood. But part of the philosophical problem, as Hussed saw it. is to step 
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back from the taken-for-granted and devise a technique to understand how the 
taken-for-granted arises and to grasp the nature and meaning of the "essence" 
of things. The "eidetic reduction." as Husserl called it. is an attempt to uncover 
the essential principles underlying and inseparable from the concrete. actual 
experiences of the world. Through the process of "free imaginative variation" one 
takes examples from experience and tries to discern those properties in things 
or ideas that would be considered invariant or generic qualities in them. What it 
is. in other words. that distinguishes the particular concrete objects or ideas as 
representing examples of a general or abstract type of phenomenon? What are 
the essential qualities or characteristics discoverable in each of these examples 
and which must be present for each of these concrete examples to be then 
conSidered as belonging to a particular general or universal type? 
As I explain. this Husserlian method is the basis for Mises' statement. 
"The starting point of praxeology is not a choice of axioms and a decision about 
methods of procedure. but reflection about the essence of action" (Mises. 1966. 
39). In his major treatise. Human Action. Mises argues that the primary method 
of theozy fonnation is mental experiments through the device of "imaginary 
constructions." Whether it be the basic concept of "action." or the meanings of 
"ends" and "means" and "scarcity." and "costs" and "benefits." or the functional 
meaning of "entrepreneur." or the distinctive properties of "pure market 
economy." and "centrally planned economy." or "barter economy" and "money-
using economy." Mises' method is an application of the Husserl1an 
philosophical technique. One tries to peal away those specific observed 
elements that can be separated from the core concept and then delineate those 
attributes. qualities and characteristics that crystallize as the essence of the 
idea and which must be present for any concrete manifestation of that 
phenomena in reality. 
Yet at the same time. I show that following Hussert's own understanding 
of his "essentialist" method does not imply that a final. definitive "essence" of 
things. in any absolutist sense, can ever be claimed to have been unearthed. 
Every act of "eidetic reduction" is by necessity undertaken by the analyst in the 
context of his own histOrical-temporal point in lived space and experience. Lived 
time transforms the perspective and orientation from which concepts and 
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objects are "observed" and reflected upon through the process of "imaginary 
construction." The meaning of the essence of things is always open to new 
discovery. And. thus. whether it is in philosophy or economics the growth of 
knowledge and understanding is a continual process. never terminating in 
some definitive end-state of completely certain knowledge. 
Husserl sI}0ke of a "taken-for-granted" shared world of common meaning 
that the method~"eidetic reduction" is supposed to get behind. But in common-
sense everyday existence it is in terms of these shared meanings that men live. 
act and form expectations for purposes of making plans and orienting 
themselves towards the others With whom they share the social world. What is 
this shared world of intersubJective meaning? How do men orient themselves to 
each other through its common properties and form expectations for purposes 
of coordination of their interdependent plans? In several essays I have 
attempted to explain how the Austrtans came to see this process. and at the 
same time extend their contributions by using the writings of the sociologist, 
Alfred Schutz. to understand more fully the subjectivist nature of the choice 
creation process and interpersonal plan coordination in the competitive 
processes of the market. 
In Expectations and Expectations-Formation in Mises' Theory of the 
Market Process (Ebeling. 1988. 83-95) I discuss the origin of his concept of 
action and his theory of expectations in the earlier writings of German 
sociologist. Max Weber. Weber defined "action" as human behavior to which 
"the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to it." And "social action" 
as an action by an individual in which he "takes account of the behavior of 
others and is thereby oriented in its course" (Weber. 1947. 88). The 
intersubjective meanings the actors assign to their own and the reciprocal 
conduct of others define social actions. Thus. an "exchange" is determined by 
the meaning the actors see in their mutual behavior. and "[wlithout this 
'meaning' we are inclined to say that an 'exchange' is neither empirically 
possible nor conceptually imaginable" (Weber. 1977. 112). 
Weber's tool for analyzing histOrical and contemporary social processes 
and relationships was the "ideal type." He defmed the ideal type as a stylized 
reconstruction or selection of typical traits or characteristics viewed as 
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representing highlighted qualities in persons, relationships or social 
arrangements which capture certain essential elements in the phenomena for 
purposes of historical interpretation of events. They are accentuated 
idealizations of certain attrtbutes in the social situation under investigation that 
assists the interpretive process. Examples would be the imagery created by the 
idealized type represented by the concept of "Latin Amertcan military dictator" 
in the twentieth century or "Russian intelligentsia" in the nineteenth century. 
Mises took Weber's concepts of "action" and "subjective meaning" as his 
own. They selVe as the starting points for his own analysis of "purposeful 
behavior." But he disagreed With Weber's argument that a general or universal 
theory of human action would be so abstract as to be unusable in social 
analysis. Mises argued, instead, that while indeed general and abstract, such a 
universal theory of human action offered the analytical schema that could serve 
as the framework within which all human activity may be ordered, arranged 
and understood. Within such a general logic of action all specific human 
actions could be interpretively analyzed and given intelligibility. 
~e~ 
The useful of the Weberian notion of the ideal type, in Mises' view, was 
its application to both histortcal studies and for understanding how actors form 
expectations about the likely conduct of others in the future, and how the social 
analyst may form expectations about the future course of social events as well. 
Mises distingUished between two types of probability estimate: (1) those 
constructed from a frequency distrtbution of quantitatively likely outcomes: and 
(2) those for which such a probability distribution cannot be constructed or for 
which such a frequency distribution is inadequate for the purpose at hand. 
It was in the arena of the second type that Mises saw many of the 
expectations problems of social and economic events. Market events are 
dependent upon the actions of men, but the actions of men can only be fully 
understood in the context of their meanings and intentions. Thus, the "data" 
upon which successful expectations need to be constructed cannot be dertved 
purely or mainly from quantitative patterns of human activity in the past, 
however useful such information may be in its own rtght. Any such quantitative 
patterns aIise only because men have chosen Singularly or in consort with 
others to act in certain ways with particular purposes in mind. A change in 
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purposes. plans or expectations can change the patterns and structures of 
social activity. Furthennore. many expectations concern not the likelihood of 
'>ic--1:i5tl(~ 
the"frequency of a future outcome. but the likelihood of the next specific future 
human event: and for this, standard probability analysis offers few answers. 
In interacting With others in various social settings and situations each 
of us builds up a stock of knowledge about the behavioral characteristics of 
those whose conduct we may need to anticipate. They represent composite 
pictures or images of those others in our minds that contain many non-
quantitative features about their personalities, their subjectively held values, 
beliefs and attitudes, and their "typical" ways of acting and responding to 
vartous situations and opportunities. These composite, qualitative images can 
be of specific individuals or of sub-groups of people with whom we have 
historically interacted or learned about from various indirect sources. The task 
of successful anticipation in the market is both to acqUire a stock of knowledge 
about the others relevant to our own purposes and to fonn estimates as to the 
relative weight or importance of each of these behavioral characteristics for 
estimating how any individual or group of individuals may act or react in a 
particular situation. 
Through the use of the "ideal type" in this way each of us attempts to be 
what Mises referred to as "the historian of the future" (Mises. 1957, 320). That 
is, the anticipator ...... projects himself into a future that is not yet, .. 
estimates the likelihood of how others may act and react if they are confronted 
with certain situations. constraints and opportunities. and til I tt jl'Atee SIleo 
then plans his own actions accordingly. Indeed, the essence of 
entrepreneurship is posseSSion of this ability above the average. so as to 
successfully direct and coordinate the factors of production better to satisfy 
various consumer ends in the pursuit of profit on the market. 
In the next three articles, I argue that the key to a more developed 
"Austrian" theory of choice creation and expectations coordination is to be 
found in the writings of the Austrian sociologist, Alfred Schutz. In Human 
Action, Ideal Types, and the Market Process: Alfred Schutz and the 
Austrian Economists (Ebeling. 1999a, 115-134), I discuss the choice-creation 
process and various mutual orientations in the market in the context of the 
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ideal type. Alfred Schutz studied at the University of Vienna immediately after 
the First World War. Beginning in 1920 he began regularly attending Mises' 
famous privatseminar, that brought together a large group of economists, 
political sCientists, philosophers, sociologists and historians who shared a 
common concern with the problems of the social sciences. Schutz's own interest 
was in fonnulating a phenomenology of the social world (Schutz, 1932). He 
attempted to integrate Husserl's phenomenological method together with 
Weber's conceptions of action and ideal types with elements of the Austrian 
Economics of his time so as to construct a general theory of social action. 
I contrast the Neo-Classical theory of choice with Schutz's theory- of 
chOosing among projects of action (Schutz, 1951, 67-97), in the context of 
Schutz's distinction between what he calls the "because-motive" and the "in-
order-to" motive. The because-motive is the retrospective analysis or 
explanation as to why an individual made a choice that he did or how he has 
come to construct the options of chOice and select the one he intends to carry 
out. This is a "backward-looking" interpretation of a choice made or planned. 
From this perspective, the elements out of which a deCision has been made are 
all given and in place, at least in the mind of the chooser. The logic of the choice 
and its rationality under the circumstances can all be explained. Because he 
came to see these as the alternative ends from which he would want to or could 
choose, and these were the available means and their uses, and given that 
these were the trade-off options as he saw the possibilities before him, the 
individual came to the conclusion that "this" was the only logical thing he could 
do under the circumstances. This "because-motive" perspective is precisely the 
orientation from which the Neo-Classical Logic of Choice is derived. 
The "in-order-to" motive is the fOIWard-looking process by which an 
individual creates in his mind the elements and options out of which a future 
choice might arise. Out of the individual's potential fields of interest, some 
particular interest (desire, want, "urge," attraction) comes to be the focus of his 
attention. He imagines some future moment when this interest would be 
satisfied, fulfiled, or completed if he were to act to bring it about. He pictures in 
his mind what such a state of satisfaction or fulfilment would look like or 
require. He then mentally brings himself back nearer the present and imagines 
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ways and means by which he can bring that desired or wanted projected future 
state of affairs into existence. He may undertake any number of such mental 
projections into the future, imagining various sets of ends and means that are 
then competing options vying for accomplishment, and from which he may 
decide to choose. 
He may retrace the mental steps of some previous imagined project to 
incorporate things he has "learned" and thought of in fantasizing about other 
imaged projects, and then reshape this earlier goal and plan of action. He 
begins to weigh and compare the alternatives, and thinks what each is worth to 
him - what is the valued benefit of each and what costs in terms of forgone 
projects and uses of means he might be Willing to pay - as the price to bring any 
~ 
one"them to fruition. All of this is occurring in time and takes time. And each 
~t.xIL-t 
represents a purpose and a plan the actualized outcome fII which he cannot be 
oJ: tl e.el/;~in. pellec y--. 
Herein lies the inherent unpredictability of choice and decision-making 
in the logic of action: "'The analyst, as a result, cannot know with predictive 
certainty what the actor's choice will be, ex ante, because the actor does not 
even know what the alternatives are or how he shall evaluate and rank them 
independent of the temporal 'fantasizing' process out of which a choice may be 
made. . . .In this sense, our future choices are not only hidden from the social 
and economic analyst, but from ourselves as well. We can never really know our 
own choices until we make them. Thus knowledge about our own choices 
always awaits us in our own future, whether that future is a moment from now 
or decades away" (125-126). 
Schutz also developed a theory of the "structures of intersubJective 
meaning and orientation." Each of us is born into a world of shared 
intersubjective meanings, in the context of which we come to understand what 
are the meanings of objects and actions: this is a "coffee cup" or a "TV remote," 
this is an act of "heroism" or of "treachery," while this man in this type of 
activity is a "college professor" or this a man in this type of activity is an "auto 
mechanic." 
Such typifications of action, Schutz said, could be placed on a spectrum 
from extreme generality to detailed specificity. I suggest that one can take this 
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idea of Schutz's and apply it to various categoIies and situations in economics 
for clarification of market relationships. Thus, the most general typification of 
man would be the most abstract: man as imaginer of ends, conceiver of means, 
weigher of alternatives, chooser among ends and doer of acts. Here is any man 
and every man, the universal in man and the human condition, the economist's 
isolated "Robinson Crusoe," in whose doings can be found all the elements of 
action and choice. 
At the other end of Schutz's spectrum is the "face-to-face" relationship. 
Here we are confronted not with any man but a specific other. This other can be 
typified in terms of his unique and particular characteIistics as a unique man 
among many men. Knowledge can be gained and expectations formed about the 
detailed behavioral qualities in this specific person: "he can't resist a chocolate," 
"he always stutters in the company of a woman," "he'll never give in, not even 
under torture." This is the economist's case of bilateral monopoly, where two 
transactors are face-to-face, sizing each other up, calculating the other's 
minimum supply price or maximum demand price, trying to push the 
bargaining process as far as possible to their own respective advantage without 
pushing it so far that one of them decides to pass up the trading opportunity all 
together. 
Somewhere in the middle of Schutz's spectrum is the economist's 
representation of "perfect competition." Here it is not all men or just one other 
man, but a large number of specific, though anonymous others in the form of 
"many buyers and sellers," each of whom views themselves as a "price taker." 
But they are price takers, regardless of how many "many" means in this case, 
because of the way they typify others and themselves in regard to their ability to 
influence the market price through the amount they may offer to buy or sell. If 
actors act like price-takers in a particular market it is not because of any 
"objective" conditions, per se, but because of the way they perceive theirs and 
the other's capacity to modify the market price through their individual actions. 
It is the subjective meanings they see in their own actions and the actions of 
others that make their behavior that of either price-takers or price-makers. 
Central to the market process, as the Austrians have long emphasized, is 
the role of the entrepreneur. The special task of the entrepreneur is to be able 
23 
to "read the market." But reading the market means the ability to form 
expectational judgments about future consumer demand, the least costly ways 
in which factors of production may be combined for manufacturing the goods 
those consumers may want to buy, and anticipating the plans and strategies of 
one's supply-side rivals so as to do better than one expects they are planning to 
do. Crucial to the entrepreneur's talent is his ability to be that "historian of the 
future:; to which Mises referred. He must successfully form ideal typifications of 
subgroups of consumers and anticipate, for example, how they will respond to a 
five percent reduction in the price, or a shift in the style or variety of the 
product offered, or how they might react to a particular advertiSing campaign to 
make those consumers aware of what is available and where. The competition 
of the market, in which profits are earned or losses suffered, is, therefore, a 
competition among Schutzian projected fantaSies in the minds of rival 
entrepreneurs over imagined and attempted designs to influence the shape-of-
things-to-come. 
All of the actions by entrepreneurs and others in the social system of 
division of labor occur in the foreground of a background that includes shared 
ideal typifications concerning such things as the stability of the political order, 
the security of property rights, the enforceability of contracts, and the general 
social rules of honesty and trust. 
In Toward a Hermeneutical Economics: Expectations. Prices and the 
Role of Interpretation in the a Theory of the Market Process (Ebeling, 1986, 
138-153) I utilize Schutz's conception of structures of intersubJective meaning 
as an alternative to both Rational Expectations theory and Hayek's theory of the 
price system as the market's mechanism for the dissemination of information. 
Rational Expectations theory grew out of the Monetarist critique of Keynesian 
Economics. The Keynesians argued that members of the work force suffer from 
"money illusion," 1.e., a systemic failure to distinguish between nominal wages 
earned and the real value of that money wage as influenced by changes in the 
purchasing power of the monetary unit. Monetarists argued that workers are 
ultimately concerned with their real wage, I.e., the purchasing power over goods 
and services their earned money wage will buy in the market. Incomplete 
information concerning the actual rate of price inflation (or deflation) may result 
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in money wage adjustments lagging behind the rate of change in the general 
level of final goods prices. But changes in the general level of money wages will 
in the longer run reflect the observed change in the value of the monetary unit. 
Rational Expectations theorists took the Monetarist perspective and 
argued that individuals will learn from their past mistakes in anticipating 
changes in the value of money. Market agents will incorporate within their 
expectations models of how the economy works and the quantitative 
relationships they have statistically observed between, for example, monetary 
changes and resulting general price level effects. The strong version of the 
Rational Expectations approach argued that agents would learn enough to have 
in their minds the "correct" model of how the economy actually works, and the 
statistical correlations between the variables that generate the quantitative 
patterns of market outcomes. The only elements that would be unpredictable, 
in the statistical probabilistic sense, would be random events for which no 
quantitative correlations over time could be discerned. I suggest that this is 
merely the Neo-Classical perfect competition assumption of perfect knowledge, 
reintroduced through the backdoor dressed up in statistical probabilistic attire, 
in which the only thing left unpredictable is the unpredictable random event. 
Hayek formulated in the 1930s a particular notion of equ1l1brium that 
has become widely used in Austrian Economics. Equilibrium, in the Hayekian 
perspective, refers to a coordination among the multitude of human plans in 
the market in which the actors have mutually consistent expectations 
concerning the planned conduct of all others whose decisions are relevant to 
the success of their own respective activities (Hayek, 1937, 33-56). But rather 
than demonstrate the market process through which the respective market 
actor's plans and expectations would converge to a mutual consistency, Hayek 
shifted his attention to explaining, in a later famous essay (Hayek, 1945, 77-
91), how the market price system economizes on the information needed by 
each participant in the social system of division of labor and how that price 
system disseminates information about changes in the demand and supply 
conditions that occur in any corner of the market. I argue that price changes, 
however, do not tell by themselves how the transactors should respond. The 
price has to be interpreted concerning its meaning, I.e., what is it telling the 
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relevant market actor how he should modify his conduct so his actions can now 
be made consistent with the new planned actions of others. 
An Austrian theory of expectations, I argue, can be found in the 
"hermeneutical" tradition, broadly defined. Though originally concerned with 
the interpretation of written texts when time and space separate reader from 
writer, Dilthey had argued in the latter part of the nineteenth century that all 
human artifacts cry out for interpretation of their meaning in terms of an 
understanding of the purposes for which the actor designed and used them. 
Weber called this the problem of Verstehen or an "understanding" of the 
meaning in the actions of the human agent. 
Applying Schutz's idea of a spectrum of ideal typifications in human 
relationships, I explain that between general and anonymous "any man" and 
the most specific "face-to-face" relationships reside ideal types "composed of 
vaIious concrete generalizations concerning behavioral motivations and 
patterns of action to be expected from any individual in a particular social role 
or situation." Thus there develop institutionalized modes of conduct to be 
expected by anyone performing a particular role or function in the society. 
Thus, there is a type of behavior institutionally expected from anyone 
performing the task of "mailman," "railway conductor," "policeman," of 
"restaurant waiter," within a social order during any historical period. 
'The social standardizations of role and function in the form of typical 
modes of conduct serve as the foundations for the construction of expectations 
by agents in the social and economic arenas. They enable each to understand 
and anticipate to various degrees, the conduct of others in various settings and 
circumstances. They enable each of us to believe that others will, in turn, have 
an ability to understand and interpret our own purposes and meanings when 
we wish to achieve particular ends that require the coordination of our own 
actions with theirs .... The routinization of behavior along typical patterns 
introduces ranges of knowability about the possible future conduct and 
motivations of others. It is what makes society and economies possible in lieu of 
a 'perfect knowledge' of each separate individual and his or her unique 
eccentricities and differences." (146). 
26 
Coordination in the market becomes possible. I argue. precisely because 
meanings are not private meanings. but shared meanings concerning the 
intention in an action. But besides the generally shared intersubjective 
meanings that we all would have in common as members of a society. "the 
normal process of division of labor would bring with it not only a specialization 
in production skills but knowledge skills as well concerning segments of 
activities in the market. There occurs a 'social distribution of knowledge'" (148). 
To speak of "specialist" in the manufacture and marketing of wood 
furniture refers not only to a talent concerning production possibilities. but also 
to the entrepreneurial skill of knowing the conditions in his localized market in 
the diviSion of labor. "A vital portion of each individual's knowledge of his 
unique market circumstances is a set of specific ideal types concerning the 
buyers and sellers. and typical causes and effects from changing conditions in 
his market. These specific ideal types are known to him and structured by him 
in his mind and are the implicit background in the foreground of which he 
makes his market-related decisions .... The entrepreneurial element is then to 
decide which out of this stock of typifications is the one most likely the best 
interpretation considering the market context as the decision maker sees it. 
. . .Market prices are used in conjunction with the ideal typifications in the 
minds of the actors in the social division of knowledge .... And it is the 
structure of prices within the structures of meanings that create the potential 
for market coordination" (149). 
In Cooperation in Anonymity (Ebeling. 1987. 81-91) I develop this 
theme further. Rational Expectations theory. I argue. relies on two 
assumptions: (1) that there is suffiCient repetition and constancy in social and 
economic events that a probability distribution of outcomes can be constructed; 
and (2) that agents are primarily concerned with the probabilities of classes of 
outcomes rather than the tum of specific events. Neither assumption can be 
taken as necessarily true. The presence of order does not require and does not 
often include regularities or patterns in the statistical meaning of the terms. 
Language possesses distinctly logical patterns and order but the particular 
forms in which those patterns will manifest themselves in verbal or written 
everyday usage are unpredictable statistically. The market process manifests 
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structured order but the configurations that it may take on following any 
change in circumstances cannot, necessarily, be statistically anticipated. 
Furthermore, in the ordinary everyday activities of the market many decisions 
require judgments concerning the specific next set of values of market events, 
not on the possible average value of a series of outcomes over time. In the 
success or failure of a business enterprise it is, by analogy, not sufficient to be 
told that the likelihood of a three coming up when a fair die is thrown is one out 
of six; it is frequently necessary to make an informed expectation about whether 
a three will or will not show up on the actual next throw of the die. And for this, 
standard probability theory offers no answer. 
Schutz's structures of intersubjective meaning offer an alternative 
method for expectations formation in a world in which statistical probability 
theory is not always applicable. The "personal" ideal types that we construct of 
various individuals and groups of individuals through interaction with or 
information about them, and the "course-of-action" ideal types that we come to 
reply upon from individuals undertaking various standardized and routinized 
modes of conduct, aSSist each of us to anticipate the actions and responses of 
others in a wide variety of social and economic settings. Even if unique or 
infrequent events occur, we can call upon these ideal typifications and form an 
expectation about how we might expect others to respond in this concrete 
circumstance due to the "picture" we have constructed in our minds of them - a 
picture that contains qualitative elements concerning their character, motives 
and goals that can never be discovered or understood merely from the strictly 
quantitative residues of their past acts. 
Another dimension to Schutz's theory is his reference to "the multiple 
realities of the social world." The meanings signed to objects and relationships 
are open to a wide variety of interpretive uses, depending upon the perspective 
or purpose for whIch they are being used. Thus, for the astronomer the moon 
represents a physical body possessing size and weight that due to the 
gravitational pull of the Earth maintains a certain distance from and follows a 
certain rotation around our planet; for the young lovers looking up at the sky 
during a clear night it may create emotions of romance. For the politician the 
use of the rhetoric of "national interest" may be a consciously cynical tool to 
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rationalize protectionist legislation for a special interest; for the citizen hearing 
his rhetoric it may arouse psychological feelings of collective belonging and 
fears of "the foreigner." 
In the social sciences, the analyst who desires to understand the 
structures of intersubJective meaning and the ideal typifications as used by the 
social actors, must design his own theoretical schemas to reflect them. "The 
social analyst's theoretical mappings of social orders and relationships are, 
therefore, tracings made on a transparent overlay resting on the social world as 
he finds it preconstituted with the meanings of men" (87). Yet, the social analyst 
constructs his theoretical schematic for his own purposes. Thus, an individual's 
deciSion to purchase a larger quantity of tea this week in place of the usual 
amount of coffee he regularly buys becomes transposed in the economist's 
tracing as the consumer's shift into a less expensive substitute good when the 
price of a related commodity has risen in price, given the chooser's income 
constraint and preference orderings. But the danger is when, in performing this 
transformation of actual human events into the more general abstract "laws of 
market demand," the economist forgets the foundations of his anonymous 
generalizations and begins to think of these human actions solely in terms of 
mathematical functional relationships among the "variables" of demand, supply 
and price. The functionalist stylization risks becoming the reality, with the 
human actors reduced to quantitative manifestations of "given" tastes and 
preferences confronted with "given" prices to which they react. 
"The 'anonymous' categories of 'supply,' 'demand,' 'market price,' and 
'competitive process' are too often used by economists in a context-less setting. 
While invaluable shorthands for gleaning out and emphasizing the general and 
logical relationships underlying 'market forces' and 'incentive mechanisms,' 
such categories can only be effectively applied in historical interpretation, 
contemporary analysis, and antiCipatory forecasting when enriched and 
complemented by insight into the 'meaning structures' within which the 'laws' 
of economics work themselves out" (89). 
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Austrian Economics and the Political Economy of Freedom 
The socialist economic calculation debate was one of the momentous 
disputes in economic theory in the twentieth century. Ludwig von Mises has 
been credited with having initiated the controversy in 1920 with his article on 
"Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth (Mises. 1920. 3-30). It 
has usually been argued that before Mises' challenge to the socialists to explain 
how a centrally planning economy would rationally allocate resources among 
competing uses Without private property. market competition and money prices. 
opponents of socialism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had 
basically made two criticisms: (1) that government monopoly ownership and 
control over the means of production threatened to create a terrible tyranny; 
and (2) that collective production and distribution would weaken the close 
connection between work and reward that exists under private ownership. 
resulting in a falling off in productivity and efficiency. 
My article. Economic Calculation Under Socialism: Ludwig von Mises 
and His Predecessors. (Ebeling. 1993. 56-101) is an exploration in the history 
of economic thought in which I demonstrate that there was in fact a small 
handful of economIsts who had cogently and lnsightfully made many of the 
same Criticisms of socialist central planning made famous by Mises and Hayek 
in the middle decades of the twentieth century. The five economists who 
devoted the most attention to this question in the years before the First World 
War were: the German economist. Albert Schaffle. in The QUintessence of 
Socialism (1874); Paul Leroy Beaulieu. professor of political economy at the 
College of France. in Collectivism (1885); William Graham. professor of political 
economy and Jurisprudence at Queens College. Belfast. Ireland. in Socialism: 
Old and New (1891); Victor Cathrein. a Jesuit priest in Germany. in Socialism: 
Its Theoretical Basis and Practical Application (1904); and American economist. 
Benedict Elder. in A Study of Socialism (1915). Each of these authors devoted 
one or more chapters to the very question of the problems of rational economic 
calculation and decISion-making under socialism. 
Schaffle. while sympathetic to the socialist critique of capitalist society. 
was aware of the difficulties that would arise once the institutions of the market 
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were abolished. The task confronting the "single office" responsible for directing 
the economic affairs of society would be immense: production, transportation, 
housing, distribution of goods to consumers, and multitudes of other activities. 
and all to be done in the right proportions and at the right times throughout an 
entire country. All of this would have to be done without the use of a money 
that assisted in determining the relative values of all goods manufactured and 
sold. and that facil1tated the buying and selling process by serving as a medium 
of exchange. Trying to price goods produced according to a labor standard 
would be insuffiCient because the value of goods was based upon both costs 
and intensity of demand, and the latter could no longer be reflected under 
socialism through competitive pricing. And without demand to guide labor into 
alternative employments through the incentives of market-based wages there 
would be no method other than command to assign workers to needed tasks. 
And even with command, there would exist no flexible method to assure a 
continual balance between demands and supplies for both final goods and 
resources across sectors of the economy. as was fairly smoothly established 
through the market pricing process. 
Leroy Beaulieu emphasized the socialists' complete lack of appreciation 
of the spontaneous order of market activities that assured that Paris got fed 
each and every day without central plan or coercion. Prices were the "automatic 
regulators" that would disappear under socialism and with it the profit signals 
that directed producers in applying the resources at their disposal to their most 
economical uses. Instead of private traders always open to market opportunities 
there would be "offiCials hamstrung by rigid regulations and a bureaucracy. 
slaves of red tape." Instead of the free energies of millions. each aware of his 
own circumstances and motivated to apply his efforts most effectively, there 
would be cool, indifferent administrators. Instead of the information provided by 
changing market prices. the administrators would have to rely upon the 
collection of statistics that can only be made available with delay. and which 
are often defective in their precision and meaning and are not free of 
unambiguous interpretation. 
Graham also bemoaned the loss of market prices under socialist 
planning and the natural and automatic balancing of supplies and demands 
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that market prices easily assures. But Graham's central point was the 
unworkability of a labor standard for purposes of economic calculation to 
detennine the relative value and most highly valued uses for labor and other 
resources in the various production processes. The intellectual difficulty of 
trying to sort out, in value terms, the relative worth of each factor's contribution 
to production would be impossible, and the calculation problem would become 
even more intractable the greater the number of stages of production through 
which resources and labor had to pass as they were transformed into finished 
goods and services. The abolition of private markets and money Graham 
concluded, "would be fraught with disaster and chaos." 
Cathrein's main argument was that under the market economy it was 
unnecessary for any businessman or group of businessmen to possess and 
utilize all the relevant information in the market. There occurred a division of 
knowledge in which each businessman in each comer of the market was only 
required to master and utilize that fraction of knowledge in the economy as a 
whole that was important and useful to his particular specialized productive 
tasks. All these partial bits of knowledge were brought together through market 
prices and competition. The central planner, on the other hand, would have to 
acquire detailed information about each circumstance in all the comers of the 
market, and integrate it in a manner that would assure the precise fulfIllment of 
every demand for producible goods for the entire population. "All of the work 
and care, which at present is divided among thousands of different firms, would 
fall to the share of the central planning government. ... Can any human 
wisdom be equal to this stupendous task?" Cathrein asked. 
Elder's focus was on the lack under socialism of a competitive process for 
market discovery of entrepreneurial talent. Who will pick the central planning 
leadership and by what criteria? The market tests those who desire to try their 
hand at entrepreneurial direction of production through the earning of profits 
or the suffering of losses. But such a rigorous standard would be lacking under 
socialism. Honest and good intentions do not an entrepreneur make. Thus, the 
selection of the personnel of the central planning authority would be flawed and 
inferior to that of the market economy. 
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These five economists had captured in their criticism much of the 
essence of the later Austrians. They looked upon competition as a process of 
discovery that guided production and selected entrepreneurs in the system of 
division of labor. The market provided an avenue for local and decentralized use 
of knowledge that eliminated the need for central mastery of all the information 
needed to plan an economy. They viewed prices as rapidly registering every 
change in market conditions, informing actors about the directions of consumer 
demand, and providing the tool for economic calculation and the allocation of 
resources among competing uses. All of these benefits. they argued. would be 
lost under socialism. 
I also summarize the essential elements of Mises' own critique of 
socialism in contrast to these earlier writers and show the development of 
Mises' argument in his first formulation in 1920 and its more refined exposition 
in Human Action in 1949. In his 1920 critique Mises emphasized that, firstly, 
the advantage of the market over socialism is that the former, through the 
competitive process. enables each member of the society to make his 
contribution to the formation of market prices through his valuations in the 
form of bids and offers. Secondly. not only are prices formed through this 
competitive process for final goods, but for the factors of production as well. 
Finally. all of these prices are expressible in terms of the common denominator 
of money for ease of economic calculation. These market-generated prices are 
what enable an efficient and rational use of the scarce means of production in 
the service of the most highly value consumer ends as reflected in the intensity 
of market demand. Without private property there can be no bids and offers for 
goods and resources; without bids and offers there can be no agreed-upon 
terms of trade; without agreed-upon terms of trade there are no market-created 
prices: and without market-created prices there is no rational basis for the 
utilization of the means of production. 
A refinement of this argument in Human Action. I suggest. is its more 
complete grounding in methodological subjectivism. Mises makes it clear that it 
is the entrepreneur who evaluates the meaning of market prices to anticipate 
the possible future direction of market demands; that the entrepreneur is the 
one who creatively imagines ways of organizing production and utilizing the 
33 
factors of production. Profit opportunities are, in a fundamental sense, created 
by the entrepreneur through his imagining future possibilities and designing 
cost-saving ways to manufacture potentially desired goods: "It is the 
entrepreneurial decision that creates either profit or loss," Mises said. "It is 
mental acts, the mind of the entrepreneur, from which profits ultimately 
originate. Profit is a product of the mind, a success in anticipating the future 
state of the market." Thus, I explain, in the developed Austrian analysis, prices 
are given meaning and used to create opportunities by the market actors. They 
are neither "given" nor passively responded to, as in Neo-Classical Economic 
theory. 
In The Free Market and the Interventionist State (Ebeling. 1998, 9-
46), I apply the Austrian approach to a critique of three rationales for 
government intervention in the market economy: the ideal of "perfect 
competition," "social justice" and the "public interest." The perfect competition 
model has continued to serve as the implicit benchmark according to which the 
actual market and its results are judged. It assumes: a multitude of buyers and 
sellers each too small to influence the market price; each seller manufactures a 
product that is identical to those produced by the other sellers in the same 
market; there are no technological or other barriers that prevent immediate 
reallocation of resources across markets in the face of any changed profit 
opportunity; and all partiCipants possess perfect (or sufficient) knowledge to 
assure they never buy or sell at a price less attractive than the best offer 
objectively existing in the market. 
I argue that in this conception of a perfect market "competitive" is used 
as a noun rather than a verb. It is explained in such a way that it defines a 
state of affairs in which any rivalrous meaning to competition is eliminated. It 
portrays a static state or situation having nothing to do with actions or 
activities. This is in contrast to the everyday meaning of competition in which 
the word is taken to refer to attempts to do better than others. To compete in 
this latter sense means to offer to sell at a more attractive price, to devise a 
differentiated improved product, to try to enter a market head of others so as to 
be first in serving some consumer demand, and to try to create or discover new 
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knowledge and information in the quest for improving supply conditions as an 
avenue for earning profits. 
The very actions defined as "anti-competitive" in the Neo-Classical 
conception of competitive are viewed as the true essence of competition in the 
Austrian scheme of things. Any attempts to prevent competition (as a verb) 
through regulation must retard the movement towards better satisfaction of 
consumer standards of living. The most that governments can do is to be 
concerned with clear delineation and enforcement of the market rules of the 
game: the legal recognition and enforcement of rights to life. liberty and 
property against force and fraud. Each participant is then left free to use his 
own knowledge as he sees fit, and bring it to bear not only for his own 
improvement but also for the indirect betterment of others in society as well. 
Markets and competition should be considered to be properly "working" when: 
(1) markets are not restricted or closed by political regulation; (2) taxes do not 
act as barriers to work. saVings and capital formation: and (3) interventions do 
not attempt to deflect market outcomes from the path they would follow when 
guided by the profit incentives of the market in the service of consumer 
demand. 
Arguments for social justice rest upon a vaIiety of assumptions. 
Including the notion of exploitation under capitalism; the concern that market 
forces generate "unfair" inequalities of wealth and income; and the fear that 
competition produces unreasonable insecurities for employment and income. I 
argue that the first charge. of exploitation under capitalism. originates in Marx's 
confusions about profit and interest. Profit arises from entrepreneurial 
discovertes of discrepancies between the costs of factors of production and the 
anticipated prices at which goods may be sold with the assistance of those 
factors. The very nature of competition is to compete profits away. when 
competition is understood in the rivalrous sense: profits are transitory 
phenomena which competition eliminates over time. The long-run tendency of 
the market is for competition to equate cost-prices and selling prices. What 
capitalists earn. even in the long run. is interest income. But. I explain. Bohm-
Bawerk demonstrated more than a century ago that the discounted value of the 
factors of production arises from the fact that production takes time. and 
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during the period of production the capitalist-entrepreneur advances income to 
the contracted factors of production, to save them the need to wait until the 
product is manufactured and ready for sale at some point in the future. Thus, 
the apparent "surplus" over costs earned by the capitalist-entrepreneur is in 
fact the price for foregoing use of some portion of his wealth until a product is 
ready for marketing to the consuming public. 
The second rationale for a policy of social Justice is the claim of 
unreasonable inequalities in income and wealth. Here I draw upon Hayek's 
argument that the market as an unplanned order of social relationships does 
not reward members of the society on the basis of their "merits," but pays 
people on the basis of the value of their services in contributing towards the 
manufacture of a product desired by consumers. Indeed, the market does not 
"distribute" income at all; it Is earned through the competitive pricing process 
that gUides individuals to integrate themselves into the social system of division 
of labor as a reflection of the market's estimate of their most highly valued 
comparative advantage. Furthermore, the degree of knowledge that would be 
needed concerning the attributes and "Just desserts" of each member of the 
society to assign to each their "just" share is beyond human capacity and 
ultimately arbitrary. 
The third rationale for social justice is based on the idea that market 
competition generates unreasonable instability in employment and income. 
Changes in the methods and direction of production by necessity result in 
changes in how and what is produced, as well as by whom and where. I draw 
upon the earlier writings of Allen G. B. Fisher, who argued that only reasonable 
perspective from which to look at this matter is from the interests of the society 
as a whole, and not the sectional interests of particular groups at a moment in 
time. He reasoned that without willingness on the part of each member of the 
society to adjust to changes in market conditions we run the risk of a loss of 
material progress, as well as possible dislocation and stagnation. 
But I add to this that the very nature of a system of voluntary exchange 
is that each member must be willing to abide by the fact that his success or 
failure, profit or loss, increase or decrease in income is dependent upon his 
ability to serve his fellow men in the arena of trade, just as they serve him in 
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the same way. Indeed, losses, decreased income, falling profit-margins are all 
useful "negative feedback" infonning the individual that changed circumstances 
necessitate his revising his plans, rearranging his productive activities and 
modifying where and how he participates in the system of division of labor. But 
this "dictation" by the market that requires him to "change his ways, or else!" 
neither threatens nor uses force. It merely takes the fonn of a change in the 
monetary returns he can earn from doing various tasks for others. He is left free 
to decide whether or not he wishes to change what he does, and if so how. He is 
left free to choose. 
I also point out the negative consequences from resisting market-directed 
change. The state can only subsidize the pre-existing relative income positions 
of some by taxing the income of others. This weakens the incentives of the 
successful to be alert and responsive to market opportunities, and redistributes 
resources away from things consumers value more highly to those they value 
less highly. It also creates the incentive for individuals to divert their productive 
energies away from market-oriented activities for efforts to acquire favors, 
protections and redistributions from the state, all of which diminishes the 
satisfaction of consumer demands. And subsidizing unprofitable activities 
reinforces the reSistance to change, making economic progress that much more 
difficult. 
Finally, the argument of the "public interest" has been made against the 
results and activities of the market economy. First, I argue that the very notion 
of a "public interest" is a slippery concept impossible to define or specify in any 
non-arbitrary way. Indeed, a complex society has no over-arching hierarchy of 
agreed-upon interests. The essence of a complex society order is that every 
individual has his own hierarchy of values, which he pursues through mutually 
advantageous trades with others. In the market economy every one is both an 
end in himself and a means to the ends of others. As a consumer an individual 
chooses his own ends and others serve him in their roles as producers, and he 
in tum serves them in his role as a producer, to earn the financial wherewithal 
to reenter the market as a consumer once more. 
Another area in which the claim of the public interest is raised concerns 
environmental protection. But I argue that most if not all environmental 
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problems arise from a lack of markets for the "endangered" resource. Where 
resources are privatized incentives are created to economize. husband. and 
conserve them to the extent that they have potentially valuable uses in the 
future. But more importantly, in the market individuals are able to decide what 
is worth preserving. in what quantities and in what qualitative state. Market 
prices and profitability function as the entrepreneurial incentives to provide and 
care for those things members of the consuming public value enough to pay for. 
including preservation of things considered of natural beauty and significance. 
The case for the public interest is raised in the area of those things 
considered to be "public goods." I reason that when looked at more closely 
many of the goods or services usually labeled as public goods - roads, 
highways, lighthouses. parks and other common facilities - in most instances 
can in fact be supplied by the private sector, if only appropriate property rights 
arrangements permit it. Proprietary communities can easily provide parks. 
roads, street lighting. schools, and shopping areas for example. Private 
corporations that construct shopping malls create accessible facilities "for free." 
precisely to attract the consuming public. 
Finally. I discuss the moral consequences of the political interventionist 
system. When individuals tum to the state to do things for them. the use of 
coercion inevitably follows. The rules of peaceful conduct soon evaporate. The 
more political the social and economic environment, the more force, corruption 
and ideological subterfuge become the means to personal survival and 
prosperity, at the expense of others. And, as Mises warned in the 1920s, men 
who begin by violating government regulations to survive may soon lose the 
ability to distinguish right and from wrong, and proceed to defraud others in 
the market place. The government regulation of trade can lead to the decay of 
business ethics in general. 
The Austrian Economists and the German ORDO Liberals have been two 
of the leading groups of economists defending the market economy, and critical 
of both socialism and political interventionism in the twentieth century. I 
explain the similarities and differences between these two schools in, The 
Limits of Economic Polley: The Austrian Economists and the German 
ORDO Liberals (Ebeling, 1999b, 145-166). A group of liberal-oriented German 
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economists had opposed the growth of collectivism in central Europe in the 
1920s and 1930s. In the years immediately after the Second World War. two of 
them. Walter Eucken and Franz Bohm. founded a yearbook for the Order of 
Economy and Society. or ORDO for short. It became the focal point for those 
economists in Germany convinced of the superiority of the market economy 
over all forms of socialism. They were the founders of what has become known 
as the "social market economy." 
Throughout the 1920s. 1930s and 1940s. the Austrians and German 
Liberal economists shared an opposition to certain currents in political-
economic theory and policy. They both defended the idea of "laws of economics" 
against the anti-theoretical position of the German Historical School. And they 
shared an opposition to socialist central planning. Like the Austrians. these 
German economists argued that the entrepreneur was the creative force of 
market innovation and coordination. and that socialists suffered from the 
"hubris of the intellectual." believing they could successfully socially engineer 
an entire economy. And like the Austrians. they argued that any complex social 
order could not function without a competitively based price system for 
purposes of economic calculation. The Austrians and the German Liberals also 
shared a common criticism of those political inteIVentions within the market 
that could only disrupt and distort the relationships between supply and 
demand. And they both feared that collectivism meant the reducing of man to a 
mere cog in the wheel of state power and control. 
The only system of economic order that could assure both freedom and 
prosperity. the Austrians and German Liberals concluded. was a private 
property-based market economy. But their paths began to separate over the 
role and limits of government activity within a market order. Their differences 
partly had to do with their interpretation of the industrial revolution. They 
agreed that industrialization had raised the standards of living of "the masses." 
but the Germans. particularly Wilhelm Ropke. argued that industrialization had 
also reduced the people to a gray proletarian mass. Mises. on the other hand. 
considered industrialization as having de-proletarianized a growing number of 
people. and raised them to the middle class. Also. the Germans argued that 
industrialization threatened the creation of anti-social monopolies within the 
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market. The Austrians argued that monopoly was primarily a problem caused 
by government intervention, and would be solved by freeing markets even more 
from regulation and protectionism. 
Beginning in the 1920s and 1930s, a number of these German 
econOmists began to develop a theory of Liberal Interventionism that after the 
war CUlminated in the policy program known as the social market economy. 
They argued for: anti-trust laws to regulate the size and power of large 
enterprises; redistributive poliCies for reducing inequalities of income; social 
insurance programs; occupational training poliCies by the government to 
prepare people for the work force; environmental regulations; and urban and 
rural planning for a "balanced" social life; and active monetary and fiscal 
poliCies to stabilize output and employment. 
But by the early and mid-1950s, the social market economy was growing 
and getting beyond the confines that most of the German Liberal economists 
conSidered deSirable. They began to refer to the Welfare State as the "other 
road" to serfdom that Hayek had warned about during the war. The dilemma for 
the proponents of the social market economy was that in a democratic society 
there was no way to prevent interest groups from using the democratic process 
to enlarge the interventionist-welfare state beyond the limits they believed 
necessary and desirable. 
Beginning in the 1920s, Austrians like Mises had already warned that 
such interventionist and welfare policies carried within them the danger of 
social destruction. Every step away from the free, unhampered market economy 
politicized and rigidified the market process. Long before the development of 
public choice theory, Austrian Economist, Oskar Morgenstern, had 
demonstrated the dynamic process by which interventions created concentrated 
and powerful interests that grew in strength over those upon whom the burdens 
of the interventions were imposed. With each additional intervention, the 
political ability to reverse them became more difficult. 
From the Austrian perspective, the fundamental wrong tum the German 
"social market" economists had made was to implicitly accept the basic socialist 
critique of the market economy: that the market when left to itself generated 
"unJust" results and that it was possible to develop clear and unambiguous 
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standards for "just" market conduct and income distributions. The very 
ambiguities in the meaning and application of "social justice" and "social" 
market outcomes different from those spontaneously generated by the free 
market meant that such political systems of intervention were inevitably open 
to abuse and distortion of the market order. The Austrian conclusion. that 
indeed there is no stable and workable "middle way" between a free market 
economy and the socialist planned economy. seems therefore to have been born 
out. 
The Development of the Ideas and the Approach Taken 
The underlying interest over the years during which I have written and 
published these articles has been the refinement. reformulation and renewed 
relevancy of the ideas and framework developed by the Austrian Economists in 
the earlier decades of the twentieth century. This led me to restate. in the 
articles summarized under the heading. "An Overview of Classical. Neo-
Classical and Austrian Perspectives." the distinctive qualities of the Austrian 
approach in contrast to the mainstream Neo-Classical theory. as well as the 
differences in outlook and approach between the Classical EconOmists and the 
Neo-Classical framework. This also highlighted that in their views of man and 
the market process. there was a greater continuity between the Classical and 
Austrian Schools than between the Classical EconOmists and the Neo-Classical 
variation on the Marginallst theme. 
The Austrian framework. as formulated in the works of Ludwig von Mises 
and Friedrich A. Hayek in the middle decades of the twentieth century. still left 
certain unanswered questions. Foremost among these questions has been the 
particular meaning and significance of methodological subjectivism in Austrian 
Economics. Hayek had suggested in the 1950s that. "(I]t is probably no 
exaggeration to say that every important advance in economic theory during the 
last hundred years was a further step in the consistent application of 
subjectivism." And that, 'This is a development which has probably been 
carried out most conSistently by L. von Mises and I believe that most 
peculiarities of his views which at first strike many readers as strange and 
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unacceptable are due to the fact that in the consistent development of the 
subjectivist approach he has for a long time moved ahead of his 
contemporaries" (Hayek, 1955,31, 209-210). 
The four articles summarized under the heading, "A Foundation for 
Subjectivism and the Role of 'Ideal Types' in the Coordination of the Market 
Process," had as their purpose the clarification of the subjectivist concept as 
used especially in the writings of Ludwig von Mises and its application to the 
problem of understanding how actors in the market form expectations for 
mutual compatibility of plans. I demonstrated the origin of Mises' concept of 
theory formation for grasping the meaning of "action" as intentional conduct in 
Edmund Husserl's phenomenological method for unearthing the "essence" of 
ideas and objects, which in Mises' praxeological approach was referred to as the 
method of imaginruy constructions. 
Mises' use of the "action" concept, I showed, was derived from Weber's 
notion of action as conduct to which the actor assigns a subjective meaning. He 
also adapted Weber's idea of "social action" as mutually oriented conduct. And 
Mises accepted Weber's conception of "ideal types" as a primary tool for 
histOrical analysis. At the same time he also viewed it as the tool through which 
both actors and analyst attempt to form expectations concerning the possible 
future actions of others in the social arena. This method for "understanding" 
others is also the essential method through which entrepreneurs attempt to 
anticipate the patterns of future market conditions and opportunities. 
But neither Mises nor any other Austrian tried to develop and elaborate 
on this theme to any Significant degree. At the same time, Neo-Classical 
Economics over the last three decades tried to construct a "rational 
expectations" approach based on statistical probab1l1ty theory. But Austrians 
throughout the twentieth century had always been suspicious of reducing 
human activities, with all their subjective meanings and qualitative textures, to 
a purely quantitative and probab1l1stIc dimension. In trying to devise an 
Austrian alternative to the problem of expectations formation I decided to take 
an interdisciplinary approach and draw upon the writings of the noted 
phenomenological sociologist, Alfred Schutz, who had in fact been closely 
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connected with many of the Austrian Economists in the Vienna of the 1920s 
and 1930s. 
Schutz's contributions enabled me to reformulate the Austrian argument 
that "choice" Is an inherently creative and not fully predictable process by more 
clearly explaining how the elements taken as "given" in the Neo-Classical 
conception of the Logic of Choice were themselves imagined and structured in 
the mind of the actors. This reinforced the Austrian emphasis on the Logic of 
Action as being the more fundamental starting point in the context of which 
actual choices were made. This demonstrated the subjectivist aspect to all 
choice-making. in that much of what the Neo-Classical theorists took as 
"objectively given" were the subjective creations in the actors' minds. 
At the same time. each of us does not live in isolated prtvate worlds. 
Rather, we share a common world of intersubJective meanings that both 
enables personal and mutual orientation. Schutz's notion of a spectrum of ideal 
typifications provided me with the framework to demonstrate how actors in the 
market place actually form expectations for purposes of interpersonal 
coordination in ways that enable the incorporation of more "facts" about actors 
and social circumstances than can be captured merely in statistical data and 
frequency distributions. I also explained that this approach. which I took from 
Weber, Mises and Schutz. had its ortgin in an older "hermeneutical" tradition in 
the human sciences. 
Some of my writings on this theme resulted in the emergence of a sub-
field in Austrian Economics that has drawn further attention to and 
emphasized the relevancy of a "hermeneutic" or "Interpretive" aspect to 
coordinative activities in the market process. Don Lavoie of George Mason 
University, who has been leading figure in this development, has pointed out 
that, "Richard Ebeling alerted me to the literature of contemporary 
hermeneutics, for which I will be forever in his debt." And he explained that, "A 
distinct faction of the school has emerged which I might call the hermeneutical 
Austrians, who have been enthusiastically embracing the philosophy, and 
recommending bold revisions to traditional Austrian economics on the basiS of 
its themes .... The two economists who provoked the debate by beginning to 
use hermeneutics to revise Austrian economics are Ebeling, who has mainly 
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referred to Schutz and Ricoeur. and Lavoie. who has mainly referred to 
Gadamer" (lavoie. 1990. ix. 8-9. 13). 
Mark Addleson highlighted that his own work on developing an 
interpretive process approach as an alternative to Neo-Classical general 
equilibrium theory can be considered to "underscore the value of the 
contributions of scholars like Richard Ebeling and Don Lavoie. who in spite of 
strictures which academia places on younger scholars. have been forerunners 
in recognizing the potential of hermeneutics to extend the scope of subjectivist 
economics and are willing to break with convention to obtain a deeper 
understanding of social problems" (Addleson. 1995.233). 
Steve Fleetwood has suggested that my work on this topic remedies gaps 
that can be discovered in Hayek's writings on the role of the price system and 
the process for bringing about market coordination (Fleetwood. 1997, 173-175). 
Joseph Salerno has said that my writing offers "a valuable overview of Mises' 
influences and method in developing his theory of expectations" (Salerno. 1995. 
320). And my writings on interpretative processes. ideal types and market 
coordination have been referred to as a positive contribution by a number of 
scholars interested in Austrian Economics (Boettke. 1995. 74; Butos, 1997, 90; 
Foss. 1997. 195; Ionnides. 1999. 90; lavoIe. 1994. 54; Prychitko, 1994. 305. 
314; Vaughn. 1994. 129; Wubben. 1995. 138). as well as being subject to some 
criticism (Rothbard. 1989.293). 
Finally. in the articles summarized under the heading. "Austrian 
Economics and the Political Economy of Freedom." I showed the use and 
applicability of Austrian subjectivist and market process ideas for better 
understanding some of the economic policy controversies in the twentieth 
century. First. many of the Austrian criticisms of socialist central planning. I 
explained. had been articulated with a high degree of sophistlcatlon by a 
number of economists before the First World War. Their contributions to the 
socialist calculation debate had been almost entirely ignored before my artIcle 
on this topiC. I also brought out the similarity between the Classical and 
Austrian views of market prices and the competitive process. And I also related 
their contributions to Mises' own critique of socialism and his more refined 
subjectivist arguments against central planning. 
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Second, I utilized the Austrian approach to critically evaluate some of 
the arguments often made on behalf of the Interventionist State. I pointed out 
the weaknesses in evaluating the market process according to the benchmark 
standard of Neo-Classical perfect competition, the shortCOmings in various 
meanings of "social Justice" as a guide for economic policy. and the ambiguities 
and limitations in the idea of the "national interest" as a basis for economic 
regulation and control. And. third. I contrasted two of the leading free market 
schools of thought in the twentieth century. the Austrians and the German 
ORDO Liberals on the question of the limits of economic policy. 
The conclusion to which these three studies led was that the Classical 
Economists and the Austrians had been fundamentally correct in their 
insistence that neither socialism nor interventionism were satisfactory or 
workable alternatives to a functioning, competitive free market. The Austrian 
subjectivist and market process approach demonstrated the benefits from 
economic liberty over either the planned or regulated economy. 
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